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Abstract
The present article shows how the composition of an advertisement influences 
the creation of comprehension in  the receiving  process.  It  is  suggested that 
composition is a varying structure of inference fields, and on this foundation, it 
is emphasised how composition is underrated in consumer research and in its 
classical modelling  of  the  cognitive  effect  of  advertising,  especially 
comprehension as an effect, and as a contributing factor in the ongoing mental 
assimilation of the message in general.  
That  composition  is  an  important  factor  in  an  advertisement’s  cognitive 
construction of the message is demonstrated via a so-called reduction analysis, 
that is, an operation in the ad’s composition; its inference fields. This reduction 
analysis is meant as a preliminary method to establish hypotheses concerning 
how the composition supports  different  kinds of  comprehension,  and to be 
able to further test such hypotheses experimentally. 
Keywords:  Advertising,  Composition,  Comprehension,  Reduction  analysis, 
Cognition, Semiotics
Introduction
Based on Peircean Semiotics, this article develops a Matrix which may be used as 
some sort of guideline for testable predictions of effect – namely on the basis of 
differences  between  relations  of  the  inference  fields  which  constitute  the 
composition. The purpose is here to make a semiotic contribution to the classic 
sequential modelling of effect – the so-called hierarchies-of-effects models. Thus, 
it  is  argued, classic cognitive modelling of effect can be profoundly deepened 
drawing on Peircean Semiotics. The reason for this being that hypotheses that 
explain  and  predict epecially  the  comprehension  of  the  message  from  the 
structure  of  the  composition  on  the  basis  on  Peircean  Semiotics  can  be 
formulated more pragmatically precise as inferential relations. Within the classic 
cognitive modelling of effect, the communicative goal of every advertisement is 
to provoke attention, enhance comprehension, and strengthen memory. In this 
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article focus is primarily on comprehension, though without ignoring questions 
of attention and memory. 
Purpose
In  the  following,  it  will  on  a  Peircean  foundation  be  demonstrated,  why 
composition in print advertisements should be considered as both a major but 
also overlooked factor in the cognitive construction of the comprehension of the 
message. Furthermore, it will be argued that composition might be considered 
the major factor in the comprehension process. With the hypothesis that the 
composition of ads as a starting point is structured in different inference fields, 
and furthermore, that specific types of ads can be defined according to a certain 
combination of these fields, the purpose is to show how differences between 
such inference fields, and their combination in a specific composition, prompt 
differences  in  the  kind  of  comprehension,  which  is  formally  implied  in  the 
cognitive construction of the message. 
 
On  these  premises,  this  article  positions  its  hypotheses  to  classic  consumer 
research and research on advertising effect  with special  focus on the goal  of 
comprehension. Thus, the article draws attention to the not very well  noticed 
fact that hypotheses and models,  which  explicitly focus on composition as an 
important factor in the explanation of the realisation of this goal, are virtually 
nonexistent in the literature. In this capacity, focus is put on the important ACCA 
model.  This  model  was  developed  with  reference  to  the  very  influential 
DAGMAR–form (Colley 1961). 
 
Based  on  Peircean  Semiotics,  an  alternative  Matrix  is  developed,  which  can 
actually explain the status of composition. Not only with respect to getting to 
know active, basic cognitive processes involved in the cognitive construction of 
comprehension in the receiving process, but also with the goal of asking how a 
more  explicit  Peircean  conception  of  composition  can be predictive  of  effect 
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when applied on single ads. In this way, the article develops an experimentally 
testable  argument on  how composition  can be theoretically  integrated  as  an 
important  factor  in  the  explanation  and  prediction  of  effect  –  especially 
comprehension.
 
The structure of the article
The article begins with a brief introduction to the actual scientific background 
and/or motivation for dealing with the question of advertising effect; this based 
on the alternative hypothesis that composition is an important and over-looked 
factor  therein.  As  mentioned  above,  focus  is  on  the  cognitive  goal  of 
comprehension. The theories, models, and notions that are used and discussed 
in this article are a result of this focus on comprehension as a cognitive goal. 
 
From this point, the argument follows. It is outlined why and how composition 
must be understood as underlining the cognitive construction of comprehension 
in an effective way. A concrete composition is analysed with starting point in the 
reduction analysis, that is, the argument concerning  why and  how composition 
must be considered a major factor in the cognitive realisation of the message 
and  its  comprehension.  Some  perspectives  on  the  hypothesis  implied  in  the 
argument and the development of the reduction analysis are discussed, just as 
attention is drawn to other possible ways of showing the hypothesis. 
 
The last part of the article is structured around the basis of one question: What is 
the major contribution of a Peircean based approach that prioritises composition 
as the primary factor in an advertisement’s delivery of effect, when the larger 
theoretical reference is consumer research, and its modelling and evaluation of 
comprehension? Here, focus is on the DAGMAR formula as it is evident that this 
formula has been an inspiration for the development of significant sequential 
effect models; the so-called hierarchies-of-effect models. In this connection, the 
analysis is defined against the important ACCA–model. An integral part of the 
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focus  of  this  model  is  comprehension.  The  model  prioritises  comprehension. 
Unfortunately,  this  priority  takes  place  without  asking  whether  composition 
possibly  influences,  or  has  an  impact,  on  the  formation  of  comprehension. 
Without breaking with the DAGMAR formula as a general strategy of advertising 
communication  and  of  measuring  effect,  and  as  we  continuously  relate  our 
Peircean  approach  to  ACCA,  composition  is  inserted  as  a  factor  of 
comprehension.  Within  a  Peircean  framework  that  draws  attention  to 
comprehension as a result of composition, a semiotic form is set up which can 
explain the advertisements’ construction of comprehension as a function of the 
organisation of the inference fields in a composition. This particular aspect is in 
focus as it is kept in mind that Ch S. Peirce noted that every mental effect can be 
described as purely inferential relations.
Current research: Background
In the article “Advertising Semiotics between meaning and effect – Composition, 
Categories and Cognition” (2004)  there  is  plead for  a  new aesthetic  oriented 
semiotic paradigm in advertising research on a Peircean basis. The hypothesis is 
that  there  is  an  overlooked  relation  between  an  ad’s  composition  and  its 
cognitive effect. In the article, it is argued that this hypothesis is worth closer 
examination because of its clearly marked communicative significance, among 
other things. In classic research on advertising effect, the question whether the 
composition of an advertisement actually supports the cognitive construction of 
the message is poorly integrated.  It  has  never been a well–defined question, 
whether  composition  represents  a  cognitive  potential  with  relevance  for  the 
communicative  goals  of  advertising;  that  is,  attention,  comprehension,  and 
memory.[1] Conversely, the humanistic tradition in advertising research has to a 
considerable  extent  been  focusing  on  composition,  but  without  assisting 
systematic reflections concerning whether and/or how composition may have a 
supportive  function  in  the  cognitive  construction  of  comprehension.[2] In  the 
mentioned  article,  print  advertising  is  differentiated  in  to  three  types:  a 
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sophisticated, a compound, and a simple category (2004: 53). The development 
of the different categories is based on an analysis of the interplay between the 
single ads’  so-called meaning fields:  illustration,  headline,  text,  signature  line, 
and – finally – the price. Moreover, the semiotic mode of representation, the 
signs  involved,  influences  the  categorisation.  On  a  Peircean  (and  cognitive 
psychological) basis, the article thinks it probable that the different categories – 
as  defined  by  the  implied  compositional  features  –  correspond  to  certain 
emotional and cognitive processes in the reception (2004:60). Furthermore, the 
article  prepares  the  ground  for  substituting  the  linguistic  associated  term 
“meaning  field”  with  a  more  capacious  one:  inference field.[3] However,  the 
possible replacement of meaning field with inference field remains a mere hint in 
the article, just as it is not explained why it seems productive to substitute the 
terms. 
 
In the article “A Peircean inspired Typology of Adverts” (2008)[4] the hypothesis 
that  composition  underpins  the  creation  of  comprehension  is  clarified.  This 
happens  as  the  ad’s  meaning  fields  are  defined  as  a  “structure  of  inference 
fields”  and  “cognitive  effect”  is  specified  as  an  “effect  of  comprehension” 
(2008:2). Furthermore, the hypothesis is that: “the array of the adverts inference 
fields determines the inferences  made in the reception in a certain way, that is, 
provoke  the  receivers  inferences,  which  in  turn  leads  to  a  certain  kind  of 
comprehension” (2008:5). Consequently, the specific array of inference fields in 
a certain composition or in the way the composition is structured perceptually 
anchors and directs the construction of comprehension (2008:5). So, the advert’s 
construction of comprehension is considered a function of the array of inference 
fields in the composition assuming that comprehension as such is anchored in 
the perceptual process (2008:2). 
 
It is this hypothetical question of ‘how the concrete structure of inference fields 
in a composition with respect to effect supports and forces a certain kind of 
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comprehension in the reception’, which we in the following will try to answer. 
This  is  done by  carrying  out  a  reduction analysis  of  the  inference fields  in  a 
selected advert. The purpose is to demonstrate how differences in and between 
the concrete array of inference fields actually produce differences in the kind of 
comprehension that is created. In other words, the compositional  structure is 
analysed on the basis of an alternative structuring of the composition, that is, 
where some inference fields are systematically removed. On this background, a 
further  purpose  is  to  show  how  the  effect  of  comprehension  must  become 
another – exactly as a consequence of the formally new way that the advert is 
experienced because of its perceptual anchoring. In this way, the method entails 
a  completion  of  some  sort  of  manipulation  with  the  array  of  fields  in  the 
composition,  and  on  this  background  to  show  how  an  advert  builds 
comprehension, at least partly, as a function of its specific composition. 
 
However, to be able to demonstrate why and how an advert’s construction of 
comprehension is anchored in its compositoric structure, it is necessary to sum 
up some of the most important conceptual preconditions from the two above 
mentioned Peircean based articles – and furthermore to present and add a few 
conceptual supplements to these articles. These conceptual preconditions, and 
the  few  added  theoretical  supplements,  is  discussed  with  reference  to  two 
questions – both with Peircean Semiotics as the primary framework. Firstly: How 
can the concept of composition be understood? Secondly: How can the concept 
of comprehension be understood?
 
Conceptual preconditions: Recapitulation
On the basis of Peircean Semiotics, we assert that composition is a conditioning 
factor in the comprehension of the message. Firstly, and basically, because there 
is nothing in the intellect which has not already been in the perception, “nihil est 
in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu”, Peirce emphasised as he implied 
two important issues in relation to this article’s explanation of comprehension as 
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a  function  of  composition  in  the  famous  Aristotelian  dictum  concerning 
representation and significance. 
 
Thus,  and  firstly,  Peirce  understood  “intellectus”  as  the  meaning  in  a 
representation  and,  “in  sensu”  as  the  perceptual  judgement.  The  latter,  the 
perceptual judgement, was described as: “A judgement asserting in propositional 
form what a character of a percept directly to mind is”. Even though Peirce uses 
the concept “perceptual judgement” it is here important to emphasise that this 
process  is  working  completely  without  the  control  of  rationality.  Hence,  the 
perceptual judgement is actually enforced on the perciever (cf. CP:5.55; 5.116; 
7.627).  If  there  is  nothing  in  the  intellect  which  has  not  first  been  in  the 
perception,  the  implication  is  that  the  perceptual  experience  constitutes  the 
basis  for  comprehension  or  understanding.  In  other  words,  the  perceptual 
experience – or the perceptual judgement – makes up the basis or the specific 
material that comprehension at any time must be working with. This means that 
comprehension cannot be fabricated, instead it must always be understood as a 
result of a preceding perceptual judgement. Peirce emphasises this matter in the 
following way: “…every general element of every hypothesis, however wild or 
sophisticated it may be, (is) given somewhere in perception, but I will venture so 
far as to assert that every general form of putting concepts together is, in its 
elements, given in perception”. (CP: 5.181). 
 
When we try to understand an advertisement and comprehend its message, it is 
always  on  the  basis  of  our  perceptual  judgements.  The  composition  of  an 
advertisement puts  restraint  on our  perceptual  judgements,  and  thereby our 
comprehension. Therefore, the precondition for comprehension is perception as 
it is shaped by the composition of the advertisement. This is an important insight 
concerning  advertising;  composition  and  comprehension  as  one of  the  major 
communicative  goals  of  advertising  –  as  said  earlier  –  is  to  produce 
comprehension.




Secondly,  the  comprehensibility  of  an  advertisement  is  constituted  via  an 
integrated intentionality: the advert means something, it addresses somebody, it 
is often candid, and it is not possible just to comprehend its message in every 
possible way. With a Peircean notion, an advertisement is connected to a  final 
interpretant, which indicates a certain kind of movement in the comprehension. 
It is the composition that establishes this – one could say – sort of fixedness in 
the comprehension process.  Or to put it  differently,  the precondition for this 
kind of comprehension and its direction is the configuration of the composition. 
The composition, then, constitutes the basis which regulates comprehension in a 
certain direction. Thus, the composition sets the limitation for the possible kind 
of  comprehension  in  the  cognitive  construction  of  the  message  as  well  as 
constitutes the condition for our comprehension of the message.
 
As mentioned earlier, Alsted and Hartvig–Larsen have developed a classification 
of print advertising in different types based on a careful distinction between the 
presence or  absence of  the so–called meaning fields that  make up the given 
composition. As already announced, we will – inspired by Alsted and Hartvig–
Larsen – understand the basic structure of an advertisement’s composition as 
composed of the mentioned fields. But where Alsted and Hartvig–Larsen denote 
these fields “meaning fields”,  we choose on a Peircean basis  to  develop and 
make use of the concept ‘inference field’. 
 
For this reason it is important to deepen a concrete as well as a more principled 
version of Alsted and Hartvig–Larsen’ use of the relevant concepts. The authors 
borrow concepts as implemented by Roland Barthes, that is, they make use of 
myth,  denotation,  and  connotation  in  their  description  and  analysis  of  the 
different types of advertisements. However, contrary to Ferdinand de Saussure 
(1857-1913), it is fair to say that at least the early Barthes in his approach must 
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be considered linguist as he absolutely explicitly subordinates all  kinds of sign 
systems to the linguistic sign system. 
 
However, in a more principled way, a structural linguistic theory in a Barthean 
design  makes  it  impossible  to  analyse  how composition  affects  the  cognitive 
construction of comprehension, whereas a Peircean approach on the contrary 
seems  very  suitable  in  answering  such  a  question.  Contrary  to  the  abstract, 
system  inherent,  and  conventional  conception  of  the  signifié,  the  Peircean 
Semiotics operates with sign dimensions, which make it possible to describe and 
analyse forms of inference that have kept their affinity to both perception and 
memory  traces.  From  such  a  perspective,  our  Peircean  inspired  analysis  of 
advertising effect makes it possible to explain and predict basic processes in the 
development of  comprehension of  the  message on the basis  of  composition, 
because the inference process in a Peircean sense is directly anchored in the 
concrete,  perceived  and  experienced  outside  world.  Composition,  here 
understood  as  a  structure  of  inference  fields.  Since  the  Peircean  Semiotics 
operates with sign mediated forms of comprehension, which in a certain varying 
degree  has  affinity  to  perception  and  memory  traces  connected  to  the 
composition of an advertisement, as a structure of fields, it is on this basis also 
possible to explain aspects of advertising attention and memory as a function of 
the organisation of the composition and its comprehension potential – although 
these two last effects in this article is toned down in favour of a focus on the 
comprehension process.
 
The  reason  for  this  is,  among  other  things,  that  every  mental  effect  or 
modification of consciousness, as Peirce often said, can be formulated as a row 
of  inferential  relations:  “…every  sort  of  modification  of  consciousness  – 
Attention,  Sensation,  and  Understanding  –  is  an  inference.”  (CP:  5.298)  The 
effect that a composition produces is, in other words, we assume, an inferential 
effect. In this connection, it is obvious that the concrete array or organisation of 
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the inference fields in a certain composition makes the receiver comprehend the 
message in a certain, given way. The structure of the inference fields makes the 
receiver  infer  in  a  certain  way,  that  is,  to  produce  a  certain  kind  of 
comprehension of the message.
 
In  this  way,  it  is  now substantiated  why it  is  legitimate  to  contend that  the 
composition of an advertisement – here conceived as a structure of inference 
fields – constitutes the foundation on which the comprehension of the message 
emanates. We have sketched out that is to be understood by the term “inference 
field”.  This  field constitutes the basis  for  the perceptual  judgement which,  in 
turn, we assume, is the foundation for the construction of comprehension in the 
receiving process. But how is this comprehensible dimension to be understood 
within a Peircean framework?
 
Signs and comprehension/understanding
When we comprehend or understand something, we make use of signs. Peirce 
maintains that we have no capacity to think without the use of signs. Thus, in 
“Certain Faculties Claimed for Man” (1868) he stressed: “If we seek the light of 
external facts, the only eases of thought which we can find are the thought in 
signs. Plainly, no other thought which can be evidenced by the external facts. But 
we have seen that only by external facts can thought be known at all. The only 
thought, then, which can possibly be recognized is thought in signs. But thought 
which cannot be cognized does not exist. All thought, therefore, must necessarily 
be in signs.” (EP I: 24). We only have access to thoughts which are mediated by 
signs.  Thinking  is  only  possible  to  locate  by  means  of  external  facts.  Every 
thought that wants to disprove Peirce’s argument has to be identifiable to be 
intelligible, and this is only possible to identify by the use of signs. As with every 
other  thought,  this  thought  also  ends  by  verifying  Peirce’s  argument  (Cf. 
Skagestad 1978). Hence, Peirce could conclude: “…whenever we think, we have 
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present  to  the  consciousness  some  feeling,  image,  conception,  or  other 
representation, which serves as a sign.” (CP: 5.283)
 
From  a  Peircean  perspective,  semiosis  is  understood  as  a  triadic  process. 
Semiosis is the operation which produces meaning and significance by instituting 
a  reciprocal  precondition  between  representamen,  object  and  interpretant. 
Representamen can be conceived as the perceivable sign, a sensory input, which 
represents something else. This ‘something else’ is the object, which thereby can 
be said to be the subject of representation (that which the sign stands for). The 
third correlate, the interpretant, is by Peirce defined as the signs “Significance or 
interpretation”  (CP:  3.456).  In  that  connection,  is  the  sign  the  entity  that 
interprets,  deciphers  and  associates  the  representamen  with  its  object.  This 
conception  of  the  sign  process  as  basically  triadic  in  nature  constitutes  a 
theoretically  relevant  key,  when  it  comes  to  the  clarification  of  the  kind  of 
comprehension that the different inference fields and their organisation support 
in the receiving process. Peirce further specifies the triadic sign relation in the 
following way: “…it is a sign to some thought which interprets it; second it is a 
sign for some object to which in that thought it is a sign; third, it is a sign, In 
some respect or  quality,  which brings  it  into connection with its  object”  (CP: 
5.283).  Comprehension  involves,  from this  point  of  view,  that  something,  an 
object, in some respect or capacity, by the help of a sign, is made the focus of 
representation, because another sign – a thought-sign – starts to represent the 
first  mentioned  representation.  The  last  mentioned  thought-sign  often 
characterised  as  an  ‘interpretant’  by  Peirce  (Cf.  CP:  5.283).  This  process  or 
semiosis is possible to describe more precisely as an inferential process, where 
we by the use of the sign (as premise) and the interpretant (as rule) infer the 
object  (the  conclusion)  (Cf.  EP.  I:9).  Further,  Peirce  shed light  in  this  general 
principle in the following way: “In a system of signs in which no sign is taken in 
two different senses, two signs which differ in their manner of representing their 
object,  but  which  are  equivalent  in  meaning,  can  always  be  substituted  for 
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another.” (CP: 5.323). If it is not possible to think without signs, and if semiosis is 
identical with the inferential process, then comprehension must be anchored in 
inference.  Every  time  we  comprehend  or  understand  something  –  aware  or 
unaware – the same kind of movement is going on – from premise to conclusion. 
If  something is true, something else is also true: “…it  is  a matter of constant 
experience, that if a man is made to believe in the premisses, in the sense that 
he will act from them and will say that they are true, under favorable conditions 
he  will  also  be  ready  to  act  from  the  conclusion  and  to  say  that  it  is  true. 
Something, therefore, takes place within the organism which is equivalent to the 
syllogistic process” (CP: 5.268). Comprehension is in any respect a question of 
forming and performing inferences. This is the case whether we have to do with 
conscious and articulate reasoning or informal and more ordinary and familiar 
inferences without actual logical control, that is, criticism. 
 
Comprehension and forms of inference
According to Peirce, there exist three different ways, in which we can go from 
sign via the interpretant to a conclusion. Thus, we can infer or think abductively, 
deductively, and inductively. Parallel to this, it is also necessary to say that this 
implies that there are three – and only three – different ways whereupon our 
comprehension or understanding can be formed. 
 
With regard to the abductive kind of comprehension, Peirce stated in an article 
written to the Baldwin Dicionary as follows: “Upon finding himself confronted 
with a phenomena unlike what he would expected under the circumstances, he 
looks over its features and notices some remarkable character or relation among 
them, which hence recognizes as being characteristic of some conception with 
which his mind is already stored, so that a (hypothesis) is suggested which would 
explain…that  which  is  surprising  in  the  phenomena.”  (CP:  2.776).  Hence,  we 
make  use  of  abduction  when  we  try  to  comprehend  a  new  and  surprising 
phenomenon, or more precisely, when we only have a very rudimentary kind of 
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understanding  of  a  phenomenon,  we  make  use  of  abductive  reasoning. 
Comprehension,  which  in  this  way  always  is  connected  to  the  abductive 
hypothesis concerning a given phenomenon, is therefore always hypothetical – 
probable. In the article “Deduction, Induction, Hypothesis” (1878) Peirce gave an 
example of the role of the abductive process in the cognitive construction of 
comprehension:  “Suppose  I  enter  a  room  and  there  find  a  number  of  bags, 
containing different  kinds of  beans.  On the table  there  is  a  handful  of  white 
beans; and, after some searching, I find one of the bags contains white beans 
only. I at once infer as a probability, or as a fair guess, that this handful was taken 
out of that bag.” (CP: 2.623). It is because of this relation – that there exists a 
relation of similiarity of whiteness – that Peirce can infer that the handful  of 
beans which lies on the table, is from the bag in which there is only white beans. 
Following Peirce, we can describe the abductive form of inference by means of 
the following syllogism:
 
Rule: All the beans from this bag are white.
Result: These beans are white.
Case: These beans are from this bag.
 
Abduction is a so-called synthetic inference. Compared to an example this kind of 
inference  broadens  our  comprehension  and  understanding.  This  is  the  case 
because we, as we formulate a conclusion concerning the instance, at the same 
time establish a relation between the rule and the result, which is not obvious, 
and which we cannot have a pre-existing knowledge of. Nevertheless, it is very 
important to stress that we only comprehend the instance a possibility. In other 
words, the conclusion is not necessarily a consequence of the premises. When 
we are  to comprehend or  understand something new,  this  comprehension is 
always anchored in abduction. Or as Peirce stated: “if we are to learn anything or 
to understand a phenomenon at all, it must be by abduction that this is to be 
brought  about.”  (CP:  5.171).  Peirce  specified  further  that:  “The  abductive 
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suggestion comes to us like a flash. It is an act of insight, although an extremely 
fallible insight. It is true that the elements were in our minds before; but it is the 
idea of putting together what we have never before dreamed of putting together 
which flashes the new suggestion before our contemplation.” (CP: 5.181). The 
original in the hypothesis, the mentioned flash of understanding, is not a matter 
of discovering a new rule. Rather, this kind of understanding concerns that we 
understand that the perceived fact can possibly be ascribed to an already known 
rule[5]. According to Peirce, there are two important ways in which this can take 
place since we can obtain comprehension either via analogue or metaphorical 
inference. Of these forms, we will here focus on the kind of comprehension that 
is constructed in the point of departure in the analogue form. When we attain 
comprehension using analogue inference, this happens as we infer that a smaller 
collection of objects, which share important similarities in some respects, also 
share  similarities  in  other  respects  (Cf.  CP:  1.69).  Peirce  gave  the  following 
example; We know that among the big planets – Earth, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn 
revolves around their own axis, and on this background, we conclude that the 
other big planets – Merkur, Venus, Uranus, and Neptun – probably do the same 
(Cf. CP: 2.733; cf. Goude 1950: 205). This relation can be represented like this:
 
S1, S2, S3 are a random sample from the class of things, X, which exhibit certain 
properties, P1, P2, P3.
Q also has those properties, P1, P2, P3.
But the Ss also have the property R.
Therefore Q probably has the property R, too.
 
We therefore  infer  that  Earth,  Mars,  Jupiter,  and  Saturn  make up a  random 
sample of the class of big planets, and we conclude that all big planets revolve 
around their own axis. However, because Merkur, Venus, Uranus, and Neptun, as 
far as we know, share all the properties of the class, we then conclude that they 
also revolve around their own axis (Cf. Goude 1950: 205)




The deductive kind of comprehension is expounded in accordance to the classical 
conception, because it implies the use of a general rule on a specific instance (Cf. 
CP:  2.623).  Again,  it  seems  useful  to  point  at  Peirce’s  sack  of  beans,  and 
represent this relation as a classical syllogism:
 
Rule: All the beans from this bag are white.
Case: These beans are from this bag.
Result: These beans are white.
 
When we have a rule and an instance, and we understand that this instance 
belongs to the rule, we have managed to make a logical inference. The reason 
for this is that the rule is evident in all instances, and if we understand that a 
special  instance can be attributed to a  rule,  then we have been forming our 
conclusion in agreement with proper reasoning. Given that we want to achieve 
comprehension by means of the deductive form of reasoning or inference, we 
cannot achieve new knowledge as in the case of the abductive kind of inference. 
Deduction  is  analytical,  and  therefore  it  is  only  possible  to  express  what  is 
already  implicitly  present  in  the  rule.  Hence,  the  deductive  form  of 
comprehension  or  understanding  is  anchored  in  a  general  rule,  which  is  set 
hypothetically,  and from this rule all  thinkable consequences are inferred and 
therefore must be true. However, because deduction is analytical, its conclusions 
only have validity in an imagined universe. The strength of deduction lies in its 
predictive  power.  It  can  assist  us  in  making  relevant  predictions.  If  we,  for 
example, know that all ravens are black, then we also infer that if we should run 
into  a  raven,  it  would  be  black  too.  Thus,  the  relative  strength  of  deductive 
inference is its efficiency in the interpretation of relatively recognizable objects 
and situations. Hence, one could say that with the deductive form, we have a 
process  through  which  an  open  field  of  significance,  which  to  begin  with  is 
conveyed by abduction, is replaced by a more simple and definite significance. 
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Finally, with regard to the inductive kind of comprehension, its character is that 
we based in an observation of a result in a certain instance infer a general rule. 
Once again, we can return to the sack of beans. If we grab a random handful of 
white beans from the sack, and we do not in advance know how many of the 
beans in the sack are white, and we at the same time observe that 2/3 of the 
beans are white, and we subsequently roughly conclude that 2/3 of the beans in 
this  sack  are  white,  we  have  achieved  comprehension  or  understanding  by 
means of induction. This will appear even more evident if all the beans in our 
handful are white. In this case, induction can be represented by means of the 
following syllogism:
 
Case: These beans are from this bag.
Result: These beans are white.
Rule: All the beans from this bag are white.
 
Based  on  the  inductive  form  of  comprehension,  we  manage  to  make 
generalisations anchored in instances where something is true, to instances we 
have not yet observed. In other words, we conclude something true about an 
instance that resembles an instance we have already observed. This means that 
we transfer a logical truth with a certain degree of probability. Hence, induction 
must  be  understood  as  an  evaluative  kind  of  comprehension.  Contrary  to 
deduction – which indeed is analytically  specifying – and therefore is  able to 
express something with necessity within defined domains, induction is the basis 
for  a kind of  comprehension that  rests  upon the generalisation of  something 
specific. Just as abduction, induction is a form of synthetic inference; that is, by 
means of both of these processes we can acquire new kinds of comprehension or 
understandings of something. Nevertheless, induction is closely connected to a 
well-founded expectation, by which we can form a new kind of comprehension 
involving regularity and habit.




On  the  basis  of  Peircean  Semiotics,  as  we  have  made  clear  througout  the 
previous pages, it is now possible to return to the main hypothesis of this article: 
That the composition of an advert, here understood as “a structure of inference 
fields” – is a supportive factor in the cognitive construction of effect, especially 
comprehension.  Through  reduction analysis we will  show this hypothesis,  and 
further outline some methodological consequences concerning how to develop 
experimental  hypotheses  from  this  analysis.  This  hypothesis  concerning 
composition  and  comprehension  is  not  possible  to  show  within  a  traditional 
linguistic  framework  which  Alsted  and  Hartvig-Larsen  for  example  operates 
upon. Within a linguistic framework, the hypothesis will at its best appear as a 
postulate, because the comprehension process here can in no way be explained 
in relation to the perceptual  judgement; that is,  how perception is related to 
composition, just as a linguistic framework in no satisfying way can be taken as a 
coherent basis if you want to formulate hypotheses that can explain and predict 
effects of attention and memory on the basis of composition analysis[6] .
 
Through reduction analysis of the inference fields in a specific advertisement it is 
now possible to show how composition supports and maybe even determines 
the cognitive construction of comprehension in the receiving process. However, 
before it is possible to unfold our reduction analysis, it is necessary to give a brief 
explanation and a few reflections of the method in question.
 
Reduction analysis
As stated earlier, the purpose as such is not to make an actual contribution to 
the  further  development  of  the  categorisation  of  print  advertising  that  was 
launched  in  2004  and  further  developed  in  2008.  On  the  basis  of  Peircean 
Semiotics,  the  purpose  here  is  strictly  to  substantiate  why  it  is  correct  to 
maintain  that  the  comprehension  of  an  advertisement  is  supported  and 
determined by its composition, that is, how differences in the combination of 
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inference fields produces differences in the kind and array of processes in the 
cognitive construction of comprehension. Furthermore, the purpose is to present 
a perspective that is actually able to function as a supplement to the influential 
classical  DAGMAR  formula  and  the  derived  ACCA–model  and  the  implied 
hypotheses  concerning  the  status  and  function  of  comprehension  in  the 
generation of effect. 
 
The starting point for the reduction analysis is an example of the category of 
print advertisements that we elsewhere call “the abductive hypothesis shaping 
type”, that is, the example is based on the already mentioned article “A Peircean 
inspired Typology of Adverts” (2008). Hence, the example which could be said to 
be the basis for the reduction analysis is an advertisement for “Scandic”.
 
Regarding the choice of analytical example, it is necessary to ask oneself: Why is 
it exactly this category, and not another or several other categories, that serve as 
the illustrative foundation of the development of the method? The answer is 
simple – namely that the abductive hypothesis shaping category, amongst the 
other developed categories, is by far the most fundamental; that is, this category 
mediates  the  most  basal  and/or  original  comprehension  amongst  the 
categories[7]. This implies that the abductive hypothesis shaping category is very 
appropriate as the starting point for a reduction analysis. This is the case as the 
category  –  at  least  from  a  theoretical  view  –  seems  to  forestall  the  other 
categories  of  advertisements.  Consequently,  this  category  contains  a  major 
perspective with regard to the reduction analysis and the possibility of proving 
the hypothesis: If it is actually the case that the abductive hypothesis shaping 
category can prove the hypothesis of this article – that composition is a major 
supportive  factor  in  comprehension  –  it  can  be  deduced  that  every  other 
category can also be subject to reduction analysis. In contrast to this it is also 
clear that a positive reduction analysis of the other developed categories, as for 
example  the  inductive  or  the  deductive,  do  not  contain  predictive  power  or 
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represent any kind of validity for the more basic categories like the abductive 
hypothesis shaping one. 
 
The actual reduction analysis – the demonstration that composition is a major 
factor in comprehension – here includes three operative stages. Thus, we relate 
to the composition as we demonstratively remove its inference fields one by 
one. This happens with the intention to demonstrate how changes in the very 
structure  that  anchors  perception  prompts  a  change  in  the effect  or  kind  of 
comprehension that can be formally built.
 
The first stage of operation consists of an analysis of the comprehension as this is 
formally  constructed  without a  reduction  in  the  inference  fields.  The  second 
stage  consists  of  an  analysis  of  the  comprehension  that  is  built  when  the 
illustration is removed. The third stage involves an analysis of the comprehension 
that is formally built without the text. Hence, the reduction analysis is a study of 
the  effects  of  comprehension  if  the  composition  is  manipulated  in  the  same 
advertisement. Furthermore, the reduction analysis is a method that is useful in 
the  preliminary  development  of  hypothesises  concerning  how  differences  in 
comprehension are a function of differences in composition, and therefore also 
how to decide which hypotheses are relevant to put to an experimental  test 
alike.
 
The Reduction Analysis: The Abductive Hypothesis Shaping Category
As  already  mentioned,  the  purpose  with  reduction  analysis  is  to  show  how 
differences  in  a  composition  support  specific  differences  in  the  kind  of 
comprehension  that  can  be  formally  built  in  the  receiving  process  of  an 
advertisement. Furthermore, the purpose is to substantiate how the cognitive 
construction  of  comprehension  is  not  only  anchored  in  the  actual  interplay 
between the different fields of inference, but also to show how different part–
comprehensions – are determined by the interplay of the fields. The reduction 
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analysis  is  completed  with  point  of  departure  in  the  abductive  hypothesis 
shaping structure and with reference to Scandic  as a prototypical  example of 
such a  structure[8].  As  it  is  kept  in  memory  that  composition  is  defined as  a 
varying structure of inference fields, and that both structure and comprehension 
can be represented as relations between abductions, deductions, and inductions, 
our attention is firstly directed towards the reduction analysis. Furthermore, it is 
necessary  to  point  out  that  there  are  many  possible  combinations  of  the 
inference  fields.  However,  the  effects  of  such  combinations  are  not  to  be 
analysed  here.  The  reduction  analysis  and  the  hypothesis  concerning 
composition  as  a  supportive  factor  in  the  cognitive  construction  of 
comprehension is therefore solely founded in an analysis of three variations of 
the composition of the Scandic advertisement; that is,  first an analysis of the 
comprehension  as  it  is  formed  without  removing  any  fields  from  the 
composition, secondly an analysis of the comprehension without the illustration, 
and  thirdly  an  analysis  based  on  a  removal  of  the  text.  This  is  due  to  the 
principled character of the purpose: To show that composition in a crucial way 
affects how the message is built up and not least how it is comprehended. It is a 
Danish advertisement but the translated meaning of the relevant inference fields 
is as follows: “According to experts it produces lower productivity, if one has to 
wait on a meeting to begin and end on time. Would you like to know more about 
our control of the equiment before the meetings and other solutions that makes 
your meetings more effective? Let us present to you our MEETING-concept. Dial 
33 48 04 04 directly to the hotels or enter www.scandic-hotels.dk”.
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First  Stage  -  the  Comprehension  as  an  Effect  of  the  Whole  Compositional 
Structure 
Without an operation in the advertisement, its composition prompts two part–
comprehensions  and  one  major–comprehension,  that  is,  three  kinds  of 
interwoven  comprehensions.  Hence,  the  illustration  and  the  text  together 
support the construction of an abductive dominated kind of comprehension. In 
the  cognitive  construction  of  comprehension,  the  illustration  is  the  inference 
field that is perceived first. In the processing of this field, a perceptual judgement 
is  provoked  as  a  suprising  phenomenon.  This  is  part–comprehension  1. 
Furthermore, the cognitive construction of comprehension includes the text as 
an inference field, because this field supports the  explanation of the surprising 
phenomenon. This is part–comprehension 2. Finally, the signatur line is involved. 
This has a deductive quality, related to the illustration and the text. It is not until 
this field is processed that the major–comprehension of the message is realised.
 
The  development  of  comprehension,  as  this  is  realised  as  a  function  of  the 
composition in the interplay between the inference fields – illustration, text, and 
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signature  line  –  comprises  the following  content in  the  relation  of  inference. 
Illustration:  Abduction,  perceptual  judgement:  “a  collection  of  paper  clips  of 
which  all  except  one  are  bend”  (this  is  a  surprising  phenomenon).  Text: 
Abduction, the hypothesis is formed: “if one is waiting for a meeting to start and 
end on time, one can be bored. When one is bored, one can do useless things 
such  as  bending  paper  clips.  Here  are  a  row  of  paper  clips  (the  surprising 
phenomenon). These paper clips were bend by a person who has been bored, 
and who therefore has been doing useless things because the person has been 
waiting  for  a  meeting  to  begin  and  end  on  time  (hypothesis  –  part–
comprehension). Signature line: Deduction: “everybody can make their business 
meetings proceed more effectively  if  they choose Scandics Meetingconcept.  I 
myself can also choose Scandics Meetingconcept, therefore I too can make my 
business meetings proceed more effectively”.
Second Stage – the Comprehension as an Effect of a Removal of the Illustration
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By intervening in the composition and remove the illustration as a basic field of 
inference,  also  the  surprising  phenomenon  as  it  was  present  in  the  basic 
structure of the advertisement disappears. Consequently, the composition now 
underlines  the  construction  of  one  part–comprehension  and  one  major–
comprehension.  Thus,  the  text  and  the  signature  line  together  support  the 
cognitive build up of a comprehension effect  dominated by deduction.  In the 
cognitive construction of comprehension, the text is the inference field which is 
perceived  and  involved  first.  In  the  processing  of  this  field,  a  deductive 
dominated type of comprehension is supported. The cognitive construction of 
comprehension subsequently includes the signature line as inference field, and 
on this basis some consequences regarding the text are derived.
 
The development of comprehension as this is realised on the basis of a reduction 
analysis of the inference fields in the composition – in this case on the light of 
the interplay between the text and the signature line – comprises the following 
content in the relation of inference: “if you are to wait for a meeting to start and 
end, productivity is lowered. With Scandic you do not have to wait for a meeting 
to  start  and  end  on  time,  you  are  therefore  with  Scandic  able  to  maximise 
productivity”. From the signature line, some deductive consequences regarding 
the text  are  derived because the absence of  the  illustration  implies  that  the 
abductive  basis  in  the  composition  –  here  the  paper  clips  evaluated  as  a 
surprising phenomenon – are changed. Consequently, without the illustration as 
an inference field, a deductive dominated kind of comprehension is supported by 
the composition.      
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Third Stage – the Comprehension as an Effect of a Removal of the Text
By intervening in the composition and removing the text as an inference field, 
the  opportunity  to  construct  a  hypothesis  that  explains  the  embedded 
perceptual judgement in the illustration or the surprising fact disappears: “here 
is a collection of paper clips…”. With point of departure in this operation the 
composition  now  supports  two  part–comprehensions  but  no  major–
comprehension. Thus, the illustration and text together underline the cognitive 
construction  of  an  effect  of  comprehension  based  in  abduction.  In  the 
construction  of  comprehension,  the  illustration  is  the  first  involved  inference 
field.  In  the  processing  of  this  field,  a  perceptual  judgement  as  a  surprising 
phenomenon.  This  is  part–comprehension  1.  Furthermore,  the  cognitive 
construction of comprehension includes the signature line. However, this does 
not  explain  the  surprising  phenomenon.  The  signature  line  represents  part– 
comprehension 2. 
 
The development of comprehension as this is realised on the basis of a reduction 
of inference fields in the composition – here in the interplay between illustration 
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and signature line – comprises the following content in inference.  Illustration: 
Abduction, perceptual judgement: “a collection of paper clips of which all except 
one are bend” (a surprising phenomenon). Signature line: Deduction: “If Scandic, 
then common sense”. With the reduction of the text, the basis for propounding 
hypotheses that can explain both the surprising phenomenon and the signature 
line’s relation to this phenomenon or fact no longer apply. Compared to both the 
whole structure of the composition (which is abductive hypothesis shaping) and 
the structure with the illustration removed, its composition supports no major–
comprehension if the text is removed.
 
Implications: Alternative Explanations
The implicit  starting point  has  been that  the comprehension of  a  message is 
realised in an elliptical manner, that is, in a reciprocal process between a source 
and a cognition. The inference fields of an advertisement constitute the starting 
point or source of a process by which the comprehension of the message finally 
is realised.  The  previous  remarks,  therefore,  implies  the  premise  that  even 
though the advertisement does not communicate what one could call  the full 
message as a starting point, it is none the less capable of supporting a process of 
comprehension  that  is  non–arbitrary.  Via  its  inference  fields,  the  effective 
advertisement, then, is capable of producing some kind of shoulder that means it 
supports and directs the shaping of hypotheses in the receiving process. This, not 
least, happens in an order that implies a certain cognitive construction of the 
comprehension  of  the  message.  Our  starting  point,  therefore,  is  that  the 
different  inference  fields  of  an  advertisement  actually  forestall  different 
hypotheses and arguments. In addition, these arguments – both alone and in 
interplay – function as premises of an incomplete argument that nevertheless is 
completed in the receiving process.  
 
It seems obvious that this line of reasoning has its limitations. On the one hand, 
it  has  been  demonstrated  that  variations  in  a  composition  actually  prompt 
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different effects in comprehension, on the other it is actually not certain that the 
starting point – and not least the order or sequence – in the construction of an 
effect of comprehension is also the fields that has been suggested. It  has not 
been supported whether the relations and the stipulated relations of dominance 
between the inference fields are in accordance with the order actually involved 
with the assimilation of the message in a  concrete receiving process. However, 
what  actually  has  been  supported  is  that  composition  underpins  and  gives 
direction to a  certain  kind of  comprehension,  that  is,  composition is  a  major 
factor in the cognitive construction of the message. Starting from the abductive 
hypothesis–shaping  category,  it  is  suggested  that  the  construction  of 
comprehension is anchored in the illustration as inference field. This is the case 
as the receiver here is confronted with a so–called surprising phenomenon, and 
the cognitive build up of comprehension further proceeds with support in the 
text.  Thus,  the  text  is  capable  of  deepening  and  explaining  the  surprising 
phenomenon.  The  following  operations  on  the  composition,  the  modifying 
reductions  of  its  inference fields,  showed that  composition supports  or  even 
determines  the  effects  of  comprehension.  Consequently,  the  foundation  for 
further  development  of  the  categorisations  (2004,  2008)  was  substantiated. 
However, even though the effects of comprehension are formally changed if an 
inference field is removed, it is important to stress that the reduction analysis as 
a method suitable in the preliminary development of possible hypotheses to test 
experimentally, must be considered a mere suggestion.
 
Thus, the reduction analysis and the explanation of comprehension as a function 
of composition implies careful examination, in so far as it is based on a number 
of presumptions and hypotheses with regard to relations of dominance between 
the inference fields (and therefore also the different categories).  This  means, 
presumptions that  explain the effects  of  comprehension as a consequence of 
specific perceptual starting points in certain fields. Hence, the reduction analysis 
implies  further  experimental  examination  of  the  actual  interplay  between 
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composition and perception in the explanation of comprehension. Consequently, 
we will shortly outline two such possible experiments. One of these is designed 
for tracing the visual perceptual process as it  actually goes in the processing of 
the composition. The method in question is obviously  eye tracking.  The other 
experiment is intended for tracking the meaning of the advertisement as this 
meaning is stresses by its composition. The method in question is obviously the 
interview. By combining and comparing data from these two kinds of, in a certain 
sense, opposite approaches,  it  seems possible to show how composition (eye 
tracking)  determines  the construction  of  the  message  and its  comprehension 
(interview).
 
With regard to eye tracking, it should be initiated with an eye to a more precise 
determination of the possible dominant relations between the inference fields 
(in  a  category).  The  experiment  should  be  structured  on  the  basis  of  the 
following question: which inference field constitutes the starting point for the 
cognitive construction of the message? This question should be formulated with 
the purpose of determining the actual order with which the fields support the 
basic perceptual process. In this way, it is also possible to present an alternative 
explanation  to  the  principles  involved  with  the  development  of  the  two 
typologies of print advertisements (2004, 2008). This with a view to tracking and 
examining the validity of the typologies, regarding the realisation of the effects 
of comprehension that are suggested with the respective categories.
 
The interview should be developed with a view of examining the end result of 
the analysed relations and relations of dominance between the inference fields. 
By  asking  about  the  meaning of  a  message  as  this  is  realised  by  an  actual 
receiver, it can be explored which inference fields the receiver actually perceives 
actively, and which may have been supporting the comprehension process. In 
asking  about  the  end  result  of  the  process  of  comprehension,  the  realised 
meaning  of  the  message,  the  absorption  of  information  can  be  analysed 
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backwards  –  so  to  speak.  Consequently,  it  becomes  possible  to  show  the 
hypotheses concerning the dominance of  the  inference fields involved in the 
perception  relative  to  the  already  elapsed  cognitive  construction  of 
comprehension. However, to realise such experiments must be future work. 
Concluding Remarks - A Peircean Perspective on Effect modelling 
The  previous  has  demonstrated  that  the  composition  of  an  advertisement 
supports the cognitive construction of comprehension in the receiving process. It 
has  been  shown  how  Peircean  Semiotics  allows  the  forming  of  relevant 
hypotheses  with  regard  to  uncovering  a  long  row  of  causal  relations  in  the 
analysis of factors involved in the realisation of advertising effects. It has been 
shown how Peircean Semiotics permits a systematic preparation of alternative 
hypotheses that explains the cognitive effect as a function of composition. At the 
same  time,  it  has  been  shown  that  Peircean  Semiotics  is  able  to  thematize 
whether  there  are  any  clear  causal  relations  between  composition  and 
comprehension.
 
The stance has been put forward that composition is a determining factor in an 
advertisement’s delivery  of  effect.  Scandic  was  an example.  If  composition is 
changed,  the  perceptual  basis  of  the  effects  of  comprehension  also  changes. 
Through gradual operations in the composition, that is, a systematic removal of 
its  inference  fields,  it  was  shown  why  it  is  promising  to  assume  that  the 
composition  of  an  advertisement  is  a  determining  factor  in  the  cognitive 
construction of  comprehension.  With the analysis  three operative  steps  were 
implied. This is due to the structure of the source or the example: With Scandic, 
the  effects  of  comprehension  are  formed  with  basis  in  its  three fields  of 
inference. 
 
Hence, the basic–line of the analysis and the first step was an analysis of the 
Scandic composition as it  appeared without reduction – its basic and original 
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structure. The effects of comprehension here were analysed in accordance with 
the source from 2008. The second step included an operation in the composition 
as the illustration as an inference field was removed. The illustration is relevant 
as a starting point for the reduction analysis due to the hypothesis that it is from 
this field that the basic effect of comprehension emanates. With this change in 
the composition, it was evident that the implied comprehension got a deductive 
mark. Thus, by intervening in the composition and removing the illustration as a 
field  of  inference,  at  the  same  time  the  surprising  phenomenon  as  it  was 
represented  with  the  basic  structure,  dissappeared.  Without  this  field,  the 
composition supported a deductive construction of comprehension as a general 
relation because the following inference based construction of comprehension 
was implied: “If you have to wait for a meeting to start and end, productivity is 
lowered. With Scandic you do not have to wait for a meeting to start and end on 
time.” This means that with Scandic one is able to maximise productivity. Hence, 
without the illustration as inference field, the composition prompts a deductive 
dominated kind of comprehension. The third change in the composition – and in 
this concrete case the last step – included a reduction analysis of the text as 
inference field. The surprising phenomenon, the bend paper–clips, was present, 
but the foundation for the following construction of comprehension, namely the 
text, was absent. Consequently, the following specification of the comprehension 
could not occur in any notable degree. In this way, it is probably only with the 
presence of the text that the receiver is able to infer what the bend paper–clips 
actually  mean.  In  other  words,  the  text  suggests  that:  “when  you  wait  for 
something to happen, you can be bored – and bend paper–clips”. Without this 
part  of  the  composition,  the  basis  for  a  specification  of  the  surprising 
phenomenon, as this is represented with the illustration, formally disappears. In 
comparison to the original Scandic composition – an example of the abductive 
hypothesis–shaping category – this means that the forming of hypotheses here is 
even more difficult. 
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In this way, it can be noted that the reduction analysis in some way showed that 
potentially there are several more instances of the abductive hypothesis–shaping 
advertisements,  which  are  actually  even  more  abductive,  than  the  analysed 
example. However, we will maintain that the example does not break with the 
validity of the categorisations, because the example can still be  included under 
the abductive hypothesis–shaping category, but as a potential sub–category[9].  
 
The purpose of  the  above  analysis  have not  been to put  the  categorisations 
(2004, 2008) to the test even though the analysis, as mentioned, quite easily can 
be a part of such an effort. Instead, the purpose has been to show the following 
hypothesis:  Important  aspects  of  an  ad’s  cognitive  construction  of 
comprehension is a function of its composition. And more precisely to show that 
if  the  inference  fields  in  a  composition  are  varied  and  also  changed,  then 
comprehension also changes.
 
With the present example of a reduction analysis and the presented hypotheses 
that  explain  the  cognitive  construction  of  comprehension  as  a  function  of 
composition, an alternative question more closely related to issues in consumer 
research seems to force its way to play: Is it possible that an approach which 
explains comprehension as a function of composition is able to contribute to the 
cognitive modelling of  effects as described within the cognitive framework of 
consumer research? Based in the Peircean inspired development and conception 
of composition as a major contributing factor in comprehension, the following is 
focused on an important classical hierarchy–of–effect form, and in connection 
with this, a specific effect model that stresses comprehension as the prerequisite 
of additional, later effects.
 
In  1961,  Colley  developed  the  now  classical  DAGMAR  form.  This  acronym 
represents  the  words  and  terms:  “Defining”,  “Advertising”,  “Goals”  for 
“Measuring”, “Advertising”, “Results”. As a matter of fact, the form represented 
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a  paradigmatic  shift  when  compared  to  the  ruling  modelling  and  different 
attempts to predict effect at the time. DAGMAR was the first serious attempt to 
explain effect where the integrated communication goals of advertising were put 
to  the  test  as  explicitly  defined  cognitive goals.  Within  the  framework  of 
DAGMAR, several sequential models or hierarchies–of–effect developed with the 
ACCA  model  as  the  most  important.  The  acronym  represents  the  cognitive 
sequence of:  “Awareness”,  “Comprehension”,  “Conviction”,  and “Action”.  The 
sequential aspect implies in the case of ACCA a hypothesis that can be construed 
like this: If the receiver after attention (processing stage 1) does not comprehend 
the content of the message (processing stage 2), then conviction is impossible 
(processing stage 3), and also action (processing stage 4). Thus, the rationale of 
the model is that learning cannot take place without an explicit evaluation of the 
meaning content of the message, or that the advertisement’s ability to realise 
the other communication goals requires a clear comprehension of the message. 
In  other  words,  one could say  that  ACCA represents  a  specific  sequentiality–
hypothesis. If an advertisement is meant to result in a given identifiable cognitive 
effect,  the  activation  of  a  row  of  other  identified  cognitive  processes  are 
presupposed,  but  without  the  opportunity  of  creating  recurring  effects.  For 
example,  it  is  impossible  to  question  whether  a  previous  attention  effect  is 
maybe able to affect the processing of a present exposure and vice versa.
 
As we have plead elsewhere[10] within a linearly, sequential cognitive approach to 
advertising  effect,  it  is  indeed  problematic  to  operate  with  attention  as  the 
prerequisite  to  comprehension,  because  the  cognitive,  linearly  framework 
actually excludes that certain, basic features and processes in comprehension 
can be formed without any attention processes involved. Moreover, the ACCA–
modelling can only predict comprehension from attention as the linearly aspect 
implies that it cannot be explained how any possible previous attention on the 
message  maybe  influences  the  forming  of  current  attention  –  especially  the 
interception of more basic features in the process of attention. In other words, 
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the sequential aspect excludes an idea of memory. This means that the effects of 
attention always are thematized as  new – even though the message has been 
subject  to  exposure  and  processing  several  times.  Hereby,  it  is  actually 
overlooked how attention, when involved in advertising effect, is always formed 
in  interplay  with  something  already  experienced.  It  is  based  in  memory. 
Consequently,  the  sequential  models  –  e.g  ACCA  –  can  only  very  difficultly 
predict how cognitive effects are realised when several exposures of identical 
advertisements are processed.
 
With the suggested reduction analysis that shows how the cognitive construction 
of comprehension is a function of composition, it is possible to supplement some 
of  the  factors  influencing  the  receiving  of  the  message  and  its  effects.  The 
reduction analysis can be further specified, varied, and related to the modelling 
of advertising effects. In other words, the idea is to insert the Peircean based 
explanation  of  comprehension  as  a  function  of  composition  in  a  theory  of 
advertising effect, as the notion of “inference fields” is now re–focused. Thus, 
the explanation of comprehension as a function of composition is possible to 
relate to the sequentiality–hypothesis that is an integral part of the hierarchies-
of-effect  modelling.  In  this  connection,  it  seems  possible  to  show  how  it  is 
actually possible to put forward a model of effect that is  able to predict and 
explain cognitive effects of advertising, but based on a Peircean inspired notion 
of composition and comprehension. The sequentiality–hypothesis involved with 
ACCA – how the linearly aspect and the cognitive construction of the message 
actually presuppose a specific row of identifiable cognitive processe – is indeed 
problematic. In the light of the hypothesis that comprehension is a function of 
composition, the ideas of sequentiality in the building of effect seems possible to 
deepen.  As  already  stated,  Peirce  observes  that  every  mental  effect  can  be 
described  as  a  set  of  inferential  relations:  “every  sort  of  modification  of 
consciousness  –  Attention,  Sensation  and  Understanding  –  is  an  inference”. 
Within a framework that explains comprehension as a function of composition, 
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the paragraph can constitute a possible form in the description of the cognitive 
processes involved with different compositions. Additionally, it can make up the 
foundation for the formulation of a specific model with predictive power based 
in composition, that is, the development of a model within which hypotheses 
regarding relations of effect between comprehension and composition can be 
formulated and put to the test.
 
With  the  content  of  the  Peircean  passage  present  in  mind, it  is  possible  to 
suggest an alternative form consisting of the following acronym: ASU (Attention, 
Sensation, Understanding – or - Comprehension). This form rests exactly upon a 
realistic idea of inference as the precondition for every cognitive effect, including 
attention  and  the  different  perceptual  judgements,  and  where  the  last 
mentioned  process  is  enforced  by  the  composition,  and  not  least 
comprehension. Where the different hierarchies–of–effects models, as stated, in 
reality only contain predictive power on a postulated level,  a model based in 
composition on the contrary can potentially be attributed predictions that can be 
tested  in  controlled  experiments.  On  the  basis  of  criterions  anchored  in 
composition, it is possible to contribute to the classical modelling of advertising 
effect  and  in  some  sense  resurrect  the  idea  of  the  possibility  of  predicting 
advertising effect. Consequently, the Peircean inspired hypothesis that explains 
comprehension from composition implies an alternative form, which is able to 
not only explain the cognitive construction of comprehension as a function of 
composition, but also to explain how other effects are realised as a result of 
composition. The forming of advertising effect is a dynamic process. However, 
from a criterion that focuses on composition as the foundation for advertising 
perception, and in turn the construction of comprehension, it seems possible to 
predict and systematise the effects. Thus the idea is to pursue the hypothesis 
that print  advertising – as a result  of its composition – spread with different 
emphasis  on  the  communication  goals  as  these  are  described  within  the 
hierarchies–of–effect  modelling,  but  with  the  goal  of  comprehension  as  the 
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pivotal  turning  point  in  the  development  of  an  alternative,  Peircean  based 
modelling  of  effect.  In  this  connection,  it  seems  obvious  to  mount  the  six 
categories (2008) as fundamental  variables,  and to put forward more defined 
predictions of the general cognitive effects based on these categories and how 
they prompt varying kinds of comprehension in the receiving process.
 
Notes
1. When reading important text books in market communication and advertising (e. g. Sutherland 
& Sylvester, 2000; East, 1997, 2003; DuPlessis, 2005) it is evident that explicit hypotheses which 
on a Peircean basis explain the advertisements’ cognitive construction of comprehension as a 
function of  its compositional structure actually being absent. As far as we know, there do not 
exist explicit formulated semiotic hypotheses that explain the cognitive goals of advertising on 
the  basis  of  composition  –  and  when  it  comes  to  the  explanation  of  the  formation  of 
comprehension  as  a  function  of  composition  there  is  nothing  coherent  to  be  found  in  the 
literature at all.
2. Humanistic research is able to display a rather extensive corpus of syntactic oriented analyses 
of advertising (for example Ingemann 1998, 2002; Saint-Martin 1990). For all of these analyses, it 
is true that they are rather precise in their description of different structures – preferentially in 
the composition  itself.  In  such analyses,  different  types  of  syntactic  “cuts”  and principles  of 
structuring  in the  composition  are  brought  into  play.  However,  in  spite  of  a  well–developed 
conceptual framework, it is also true for such analyses that direct consideration of whether the 
syntactic cuts and organisations in  the composition also determines the way whereupon the 
message is cognitively built, remains very implicit. How composition is a factor in the formation 
of  cognitive  effect  in  the  reception  is  not  an  issue.  This  means  that  the  analyses  appear 
disconnected, because the core of what advertising is all  about – namely producing cognitive 
effects – is not taken into account.
3. Christian Alsted & Hanne Hartvig–Larsen (1991) apply the concept “meaning–field” which in a 
very clear manner shows how their typology is based in Barthean, linguistic theory. This fact is 
taken into account later on, as we show why it is necessary to substitute the concept “meaning–
field”  with  the  concept  “inference–field”.  Due  to  its  ‘immanence–thinking’,  the  linguistically 
based  semiotic  theory  is  not  able  to  explain  the  connections  between,  one  the  one  hand, 
language, and perception and memory traces and cognition in general. This theory is not able to 
thematize how language is connected to perception and cognition. This is a major problem as the 
communicative goals of advertising has to do with cognition exactly.
4. This article is yet to be published.
5. And where this pre–established knowledge can be of a more or less conscious nature. In any 
case, it seems correct to assert that abductive reasoning always presupposes a certain degree of 
pre–established knowledge which constitutes the background for the possibility of explaining a 
surprising fact at all.
6. In the literature,  the comprehension is not  thematized on the basis of Peircean semiotics. 
However, this is a cause for wonder, because exactly a Peircean approach to comprehension or 
understanding as an ongoing process emerging from different signs involved in perception makes 
it possible to put forward hypotheses concerning the relation between, on the one hand, the 
type of comprehension that is dominating in the message, an on the other hand, its potential for 
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creating attention and memory. An advertisement that triggers an abductive dominated kind of 
comprehension will probably also contain a higher degree of attention, whereas its potential for 
creating verbal (declarative) memory in this connection may be weak. The more abductive an 
advertisement seems to be, and therefore the less comprehensible it is, the more capable it also 
is of creating attention in the first place.
7.  If  this  assumption  is  correct,  it  is  possible  to  make  the  suggestion  that  composition  and 
cognition  is  paradoxically  related in  the case  of  advertising.  The formally  most  sophisticated 
category seems to  trigger  the formally  most  primitive/original  kind  of  comprehension in  the 
reception. The hypothesis–shaping category is formally the most sophisticated category but at 
the  same  time  we  are  here  dealing with  a  category  which  in  the  widest  possible  sense  is 
perceptually anchored in the abductive process in cognition – the origin of comprehension from a 
semiotic point of view.
8.  For  further  explanation  of  this  structure,  see  “A  Peircean  Inspired  Typology  of  Print 
Advertising” (2010).
9. Here it must be emphasised that the different (sub)categories are not empirically anchored, 
but actually emerged as possible consequences of the reduction analysis. In the mentioned case 
–  where  the  reduction  analysis  leads  to  some  kind  of  “hyper–abductive  hypothesis  shaping 
category” – the type actually refers to a somewhat imagined category. Since advertising taken as 
a  general  category,  always  has  an  incorporated  comprehensional  effect,  examples  of  the 
presented hyper–abductive hypothesis shaping category will be very few – if existing at all. 
10. See the articles “Effects in Print Advertising: The Moment of Exposure and the Significance-
Effect” (2007a) and “Reklamens eksponeringsøjeblik” (2007b)
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